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Title: Has the firearms protocol helped reduced armed violence? 
 
Abstract  
This paper focuses on the long-term objective of the Firearms Protocol supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime to reduce certain kinds of armed 
violence associated with the misuse of firearms. More than 15 years after the Protocol has come into 
force, the authors ask how its possible impacts on armed violence might be assessed; indicate key 
challenges for such an enterprise, and suggest directions for future work in this area, towards the 
establishment of a measurement tool which could help inform the recently established Review 
Mechanism of the Protocol. 
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Questo saggio si concentra sulla riduzione di certe forme di violenza armata perpetrate con le armi 
da fuoco, obiettivo a lungo termine del Protocollo sulle armi da fuoco, supplementare alla 
Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite contro la criminalità organizzata transnazionale. Quindici anni dopo 
la sua entrata in vigore, gli autori si interrogano su come misurare i possibili impatti del Protocollo 
sulla violenza armata, indicando le questioni chiave da affrontare e suggerendo alcune possibili 
direzioni future degli studi in quest’area, incluso lo sviluppo di uno strumento di misurazione, anche 
nell’ottica di informare il funzionamento del Meccanismo di riesame del Protocollo, recentemente 
istituito.  
 
Parole Chiave: traffico di armi da fuoco; criminalità organizzata transnazionale; violenza armata; 
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1. Introduction 
The international community's approach to illicit firearms proliferation began in the 
late 1990s as an attempt to tighten up and standardize national legal frameworks 
with the goal of reducing criminal access to guns. Addressing the armed violence 
that criminals and other actors commit with guns was an underlying rationale of 
arms control instruments developed through multilateral diplomacy at the UN. 
These instruments include the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (hereafter the 
Protocol) and the UN Programme of Action on the illicit trade in small arms 
(hereafter UN PoA),1 negotiations for both of which began in 1997. Almost two 
decades later, it is worth returning to that rationale to ask whether the momentum 
of implementation has generated impacts in reducing violent firearm offenses. In 
particular, to ask if the Firearms Protocol made any difference in reducing criminal 
or other kinds of armed violence.2 
When the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(hereinafter UNTOC) was adopted in 2000,3 three supplementary protocols were 
elaborated, namely on trafficking in persons, on smuggling of migrants, and on 
firearms.4 The Firearms Protocol was the last of the three to enter into force, on 3 
 
1 Negotiations took place in New York and Vienna further to the Report of the Panel of Government 
Experts on Small Arms, UN Doc. A/Res/ 52/298, 27 August 1997 and the Report of the Expert Group 
Meeting on Gathering Information on and Analysis of Firearm Regulation (see Criminal Justice Reform 
and Strengthening of Legal Institutions: Measures to Regulate Firearms, Vienna, ECOSOC, 
E/CN.15/1997/4, 7 March1997. 
See https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/248585/files/E_CN.15_1997_4-EN.pdf, and 
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/234350/files/E_CN.15_1997_4_Corr.1-EN.pdf. 
2 In this paper the authors use the following definition of armed violence: “the intentional use of 
illegitimate force (actual or threatened) with arms or explosives, against a person, group, community, 
or state, that undermines people-centred security and/or sustainable development” (Global Burden 
of Armed Violence 2008, Geneva, 2008, page 2). This definition does not include self-directed violence 
(suicide). 
3 GA Res. 55/25, 15 November 2000 (entered into force on 29 September 2003).  
4 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, UN Doc. 
A/Res/55/25, 15 November 2000 (entered into force on 25 December 2003); Protocol Against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, UN Doc. A/Res/55/25, 15 November 2000, (entered into force on 28 
January 2004); Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts 
and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, UN Doc. A/Res/55/255, 31 May 2001. 
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July 2005, and it celebrated its 15th anniversary in 2020. Despite a relatively low 
level of ratification (as of August 2021 it counts 120 parties, as opposed to 190 
parties to the UNTOC, 178 parties to the Protocol on Trafficking in Persons and 150 
to the Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants),5 it is a foundational global arms control 
instrument. It is also likely to gain further momentum thanks to the recently 
established UNTOC Review Mechanism (hereinafter Review Mechanism)6, whose 
monitoring activities cover the most relevant substantive provisions of the Protocol. 
The Protocol, which is also the first legally binding global instrument on firearms, 
aims “to promote, facilitate and strengthen cooperation among States Parties in 
order to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in 
firearms, their parts and components and ammunition”.7 By ratifying the Protocol, 
States make a commitment to criminalize certain activities, establish administrative 
crime prevention measures, and to cooperate internationally.8 
The Protocol’s immediate objectives are to constrain illicit manufacturing of and 
trafficking in firearms, and it shares with its parent Convention and the other 
protocols the ultimate goal of making the world safer for people, by reducing the 
negative impacts of these illicit practices, which endanger “[…] the well-being of 
people, their social and economic developments and their right to live in peace”.9 
This higher objective, which can be expressed either as a reduction of crime and 
armed violence or as an increase in safety and security, is in line with the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development (hereinafter 2030 Agenda).10 Among other 
objectives, the 2030 Agenda promotes peaceful and inclusive societies (Sustainable 
Development Goal 16, hereafter SDG16), to be achieved in part by reducing all forms 
of violence and related death rates (SDG Target 16.1) and a significant reduction in 
 
5 https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/signatures.html(last visited on 4 October 
2021). 
6 Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
Ninth Session, Vienna, 15-19 October 2018, Resolution 9/1, Establishment of the Mechanism for the 
Review of the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
and the Protocols thereto, CTOC/COP/2018/L.4/Rev.1, 19 October 2018; see Paragraph 6, infra.  
7 Art. 2 of the Protocol. 
8 See Paragraph 3, infra. 
9 See Preamble (Para. 1) of the Protocol. 
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illicit arms flows (SDG Target 16.4).11 The UN PoA, which was adopted on 20 July 
2001, and the Arms Trade Treaty (hereinafter ATT)12, which entered into force in 
December 2014, share these long-term violence reduction and safety promotion 
goals. 
The armed violence prevention objectives of these global arms control instruments 
express a critical challenge in many countries: approximately 40 per cent of all 
killings are committed with firearms globally.13 This general fact hides a 
heterogenous phenomenon: collective violence and individual inter-personal 
violence; legal civilian firearms and illicitly manufactured or trafficked guns. In the 
case of guns that become illicit because they have been diverted from their 
authorized users, the point of diversion from legal to illicit varies, and arms that are 
lost or stolen easily get into criminal hands.14 This is why a reduction in illicit arms 
flows – an objective towards which Protocol implementation aims – can be so 
important for advancing on the higher objective of reducing violence and increasing 
safety. With the passing of the Protocol’s fifteenth anniversary of coming into force 
in 2020, it is a valuable moment to begin thinking about its possible contribution – 
and that of other international arms control instruments – in preventing and 
reducing armed violence.  
How this might be done in practice was the focus of a recent discussion by the 
authors at the 24-hour Conference on Global Organized Crime on 10 November 
2020,15 in which the authors raised some general considerations and potential 
challenges. Starting from that discussion, this paper adopts an interdisciplinary 
approach, focusing on both normative compliance and indicators for monitoring 
trends in armed violence, and considering how the two aspects relate. This 
assessment exercise, drawing on expertise from the crime control, armed violence 
 
11 The General Assembly qualified these targets as “integrated and indivisible”, ibidem, para. 5. 
12 See Paragraph 2, infra. 
13 See Gergely Hideg and Anna Alvazzi del Frate, Still Not There: Global Violent Deaths Scenarios, 2019–
30, Small Arms Survey, Briefing Paper, Geneva, February 2021, p. 3. 
14 See UNODC, Global Study on Firearms 2020, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/firearms-
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reduction, and arms control domains, aims to make some observations and provides 
suggestions for future work in this area. 
It could also offer a useful piece of analysis and information to support States in 
approaching the Protocol’s Review Mechanism, as well as consider the impact of the 
Protocol’s implementation on meeting relevant SDG Targets. This is an area where 




2. The Protocol and the international normative framework 
Since the Protocol was adopted, the international community's approach to firearms 
and firearms violence has evolved considerably. Further to initial data collected by 
a UN study in 1996–97,16 in 2001 a first global estimate of the distribution of small 
arms indicated that more than 50 percent were in the hands of civilians.17 
Furthermore, poor handling of State responsibilities (such as stockpile management 
and prevention of illicit arms trade, including the capacity to intercept arms after 
conflicts, for example in the Western Balkans) were producing negative effects in 
terms of the uncontrolled spread of arms and related violence. Internationally 
agreed measures to improve State stockpile management, enhance civilian arms 
controls, and prevent diversion and illicit trafficking were therefore urgent.  
Parallel to the negotiations for the Protocol in Vienna, diplomats in New York were 
negotiating what ultimately resulted in the PoA, adopted in July 200118. This soft law 
instrument commits States to improving domestic legislation on small arms, 
import/export controls, and stockpile management. It was an important response 
to the growing awareness of the proliferation of illicit small arms among civilians 
and the lack of clear norms at the international level. In 2005, the PoA was 
 
16 See Small Arms Survey 2001.Profiling the Problem, Oxford 2001, pp. 17-19. 
17 Ibidem, at p. 89. 
18 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All 
Its Aspects, New York, 9-20 July 2001, UN Doc. A/CONF.192/15. 
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supplemented by the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)19 which, for the 
purpose of tracing, requires States to ensure that firearms are properly marked and 
that records are kept. The PoA/ITI, whose review process has grown to include a 
range of guidance and references to evolving good practices, provides States with a 
framework for supplementing and strengthening the Protocol’s basic legal 
requirements.  
In 2013, the ATT20 was adopted, with the purpose to impose conditions on the legal 
trade of conventional arms among States parties and to link transfer authorizations 
to considerations of the humanitarian and human rights situations. Like the 
Firearms Protocol, the ATT is legally binding and, although different in scope 
(weaponry, and activities covered)21 they have roughly the same level of 
ratification.22 
Meanwhile, other global norms and instruments have become intertwined with the 
underlying violence prevention and human rights promotion objectives of arms 
control agreements. Notably, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) n. 1325 on 
Women, Peace and Security (2000),23 includes references to the international arms 
trade and the importance of disarmament. UNSCR 1325 has led to many follow-on 
resolutions that have become known collectively as the Women, Peace and Security 
(WPS) Agenda, and which contain frequent references to the importance of arms 
control and the negative impacts of conventional arms on vulnerable groups. 
Furthermore, growing awareness of the impacts of armed violence on development 
led to the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (2006),24 a like-
 
19 Report of the Open-ended Working Group to Negotiate an International Instrument to Enable States 
to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons , UN Doc. 
A/60/88, 27 June 2005. 
20 UN Doc. A/RES/67/234, 2 April 2013 (entered into force on 24 December 2014).  
21 See art. 4 of the Protocol and art. 2 of the ATT. 
22 On 4 October 2021, the ATT has 110 State parties to the 120 to the Firearms Protocol. However, a 
number of the world’s largest arms exporters have not ratified the ATT. 
23 UN Doc. S/RES/325, 31 October 2000. 
24 Available at https://www.genevadeclaration.org. The Geneva Declaration was adopted on 7 June 
2006 by 42 states at a Ministerial Summit in Geneva. It was subsequently signed by a total of 113 
countries. Between 2006 and 2015, the Declaration was the only instrument making a clear 
connection between uncontrolled proliferation of licit firearms, illicit trafficking in firearms, armed 
and crime violence, and human, social, and economic development.  
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minded, high-level multi-lateral initiative launched by Switzerland and led by a core 
group of 15 States that promoted the voluntary declaration, ultimately signed by 
113 States, as well as commissioning research to measure impacts and acting as a 
clearing house for best practices.25 By focusing on the violence-development nexus, 
the Geneva Declaration filled an important gap left by the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs).26  
This gap was ultimately more fully addressed in September 2015 with the adoption 
of the 2030 Agenda, in which UN member States agreed that “Sustainable 
development cannot be realized without peace and security; and peace and security 
will be at risk without sustainable development”.27 Goal 16 and specifically SDG 
Targets 16.1 and 16.428 addressed the issues at the core of the Geneva Declaration, 
which in 2015 ceased to be an active process to support the new Agenda.29 With the 
adoption of SDG Target 16.4 on illicit arms flows, the 2030 Agenda for development 





25 See the three editions of the Global Burden of Armed Violence, a comprehensive study of the impacts 
of armed violence: Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Global Burden of Armed Violence 2008, Geneva, 
2008; Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011: Lethal Encounters, 
Cambridge, 2011; Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Global Burden of Armed Violence 2015: Every Body 
Counts, Cambridge, 2015. 
26 See United Nations Millennium Declaration, UN Doc. A/RES. 55/2, 18 September 2000. 
27 UN Doc. A/RES/70/1, para. 35, see footnote n. 10, supra.   
28 Goal 16 aims to “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide 
access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”. Goal 
targets include, inter alia, Target 16.1 “Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death 
rates everywhere”; and Target 16.4 “By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, 
strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime”. 
29 Global Burden of Armed Violence 2015, Chapter 1, see footnote n. 25, supra. 
30 Progress towards Target 16.4 is measured by two indicators, namely: 16.4.1: “Total value of inward 
and outward illicit financial flows (in current United States dollars)”, and 16.4.2: “Proportion of 
seized, found or surrendered arms whose illicit origin or context has been traced or established by a 
competent authority in line with international instruments”. 
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3. State obligations within the Protocol 
The Protocol aims at promoting and strengthening international cooperation and 
developing mechanisms to prevent, investigate and prosecute offences stemming 
from the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms. States who ratify the 
Protocol assume a legal obligation to adopt into their domestic legal frameworks 
necessary measures, including legislative and administrative ones, to ensure its 
implementation.31 
Under Article 5, States parties commit to the criminalization of: illicit manufacturing 
of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition; illicit trafficking in 
firearms, their parts and components and ammunition; and falsifying or illicitly 
obliterating, removing, or altering the marking(s) on firearms required by Article 8 
of this Protocol. 
Under the Protocol, States parties also commit to some specific administrative 
measures aimed at identifying and tracing each firearm, namely: 
a) applying unique marking at the time of manufacture of each firearm; requiring 
appropriate simple marking on each imported firearm; and ensuring 
appropriate unique marking at the time of transfer of a firearm from government 
stocks to permanent civilian use (Article 8);  
b) the record-keeping of all the above and any other relevant information about 
firearms, by following specific modalities (Article 7);  
c) the confiscation of illicitly manufactured or trafficked firearms (Article 6);  
d) sharing information and cooperation in the tracing of firearms with other States 
parties (Articles 12 and 13). 
Core obligations upon States parties finally include the establishment of a 
comprehensive export, import and transit authorization or licensing systems for 
firearms (Article 10). 
While the words “armed violence” do not appear in the text of the Protocol or in its 
parent Convention, the concept is alluded to strongly in the first paragraph of the 
 
31 See Art. 1 para. 2 of the Protocol and Art. 34 para.1 of UNTOC. 
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Protocol's Preamble, which refers to “the harmful effects” of illicit firearms 
manufacturing and trafficking.32 It characterizes the need to address these activities 
and their effects as 'urgent'. Indeed, historical analysis of the considerations 
underlying the UNTOC and the Protocol shows that they were designed to address 
the economic and social consequences of organized crime, characterized as 
“typically much greater than the consequences of traditional forms of interpersonal 
violence and crime against property, thus posing a more serious threat to society 
and national economies”.33 Transnational organized crime was therefore 
considered an amplifier of armed violence at multiple levels, both as modus operandi 
of organized criminal groups, and as a consequence of impunity or lack of rule of 
law. 
It is notable that, more than 15 years after the coming into force of the Protocol, the 
violence reduction dimensions of this instrument still remains to be explored. The 
States parties to the Protocol have made relatively slow progress in monitoring and 
assessing its implementation at the national level,34 and this is one reason its 
potential impacts on violence reduction are obscure. That may soon change with the 




32 See Preamble (Para. 1) of the Protocol. The word “violence” appeared in preliminary drafts of the 
Preamble and was struck only in the final text adopted by the GA; see Travaux Préparatoires of the 
negotiations for the elaboration of the United Nations Convention against Organized Crime and the 
Protocols thereto (https://www.unodc.org/pdf/ctoccop_2006/04-60074_ebook-e.pdf) pp. 593-
595). Similar provisions appear in the Preambles of the PoA (Para. 15) and ATT (Paras. 3 and 7).  
33 See Travaux Préparatoires of the negotiations for the elaboration of the United Nations Convention 
against Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto (https://www.unodc.org/pdf/ctoccop_2006/04-
60074_ebook-e.pdf) p. ix. 
34 Between 2004 and 2008, the Conference of the Parties to the UNTOC carried out a series of 
“informal” monitoring activities based on self-assessment in order to gather information on 
implementation of the Protocol. The Secretariat had received responses to the questionnaire from 
55 Member States, of which 37 were parties, 10 were signatories and 8 were non-signatories to the 
Protocol; see Implementation of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime: consolidated information received from States, Report of the 
Secretariat, CTOC/COP/2006/8/Rev.1, 12 August 2008. 
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4. What can be measured? 
Further to the normative aspects, it would be desirable to develop an independent 
parallel tool to assess the potential violence reduction impacts of the Protocol and 
other arms control instruments. This tool, if built on a broad base of data collected 
in the framework of monitoring the SDGs plus additional primary data, would help 
fulfil State commitments arising not only from the Protocol but also the PoA, the 
ATT, the 2030 Agenda and the WPS Agenda. But identifying to what extent each 
process contributes to violence reduction is likely to be challenging. The Protocol 
and other related arms control instruments are likely to generate synergies, so it 
may be difficult to separate respective impacts. 
For one thing, measuring the direct effects on violence of particular gun policies and 
laws is complicated by many factors that are difficult to control for. Available data 
has not allowed researchers to establish a clear relationship between firearm 
availability levels and firearm homicides at the global level,35 or to assess the impact 
of a single global gun policy intervention on homicides. Yet many studies identify 
causality or at least contributory effects of combined policies at the national or 
regional level.36 
Furthermore, much of the information on armed violence and illicit arms 
proliferation and possession – especially from the most violent contexts – is weak, 
with incomplete data, often of poor quality (with incomplete time series and/or 
lacking disaggregation by sex and age of perpetrators and victims, context, type of 
weapon used). The improvement of data and development of indicators may 
become an objective per se.  
 
35 See Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011, Chapter 3, p. 100; as well as the relevant analysis in the 
Global Burden of Armed Violence 2015, p. 79, footnote n. 25, supra.  
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Implementation of, and compliance with, an international instrument is generally 
used as indicators of good performance by countries monitoring its effectiveness.37 
National reports, statements and updates delivered at regular meetings or 
conferences of parties can include quantitative and qualitative information on 
progress in implementation. Monitoring at the international level may also compile 
and summarize the information received, for example, by using checklists for 
actions taken (yes/no) on agreement elements.  
Such compliance indicators are indispensable but lack granularity and cannot 
measure progressive improvements. For example, the UNODC database SHERLOC38 
contains 51 pieces of national legislation from 32 States in response to 
implementation of the Protocol and a database of case law in firearms trafficking.39 
This provides an important and growing (but still insufficient) source of information 
about the process of enacting international norms into domestic law and the 
challenging task to measure compliance with them.40 
Nevertheless, when violence reduction is not a direct, but rather indirect, expected 
consequence of implementation – as is the case with the Protocol – this approach 
has limitations. To move beyond these limitations, a mixed set of research 
methodologies would be appropriate, incorporating access to official (and 
 
37 Although implementation is typically a decisive requirement to achieve compliance, these two 
notions are conceptually distinct. On this point see, for instance, Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in The Handbook of 
International Relations, Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simonds (eds.), London, 2002, at p. 
539: “Implementation is the process of putting international commitments into practice: the passage 
of legislation, creation of institutions (both domestic and international) and enforcement of rules”, 
while compliance refers to: “[…] a state of conformity or identity between an actor's behaviour and a 
specified rule”. 
38 https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/en/st/home.html.  
39 A comprehensive review of data measuring the compliance of States parties with the Protocol is 
not available, but prosecutions of illicit firearms trafficking have historically been low. In this regard 
the UNDOC, Global Study on Firearms 2020 (see footnote n. 14, supra, at p. 12) argues that criminal 
justice responses tend to underplay the significance of firearms trafficking: “The evidence suggests 
that the criminal justice system focuses on firearms trafficking only in a relatively small percentage 
of the cases where it would be warranted – meaning firearms trafficking is a largely hidden 
phenomenon, only part of which comes to the surface”. 
40 To this purpose Neil Boister, An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law, 2nd edn., Oxford, 2018, 
at p. 412, interestingly pointed out: “it is relatively simple to measure when parties to suppression 
conventions fail to enact laws they have undertaken to enact” (implementation); on the contrary, it 
is harder to measure State compliance with international norms contained in the suppression 
conventions: “The failure to enforce them is more common but more difficult to ascertain”. 
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unofficial) crime, public health, and other datasets. As is the case in any evaluation 
process, the assessment should use SMART indicators (specific, measurable, 
accessible, reliable, and timely). Data should be public and transparent and of a high 
quality, with good disaggregation at all desired levels so as to capture impacts for all 
groups of population and communities.41 Specific indicators to capture the impacts 
of the Protocol may require fine tuning at the local level to reduce external 
influences on the minimum extent.  
The SDGs include 231 unique indicators against which to measure progress.42 These 
reflect a major effort of the statistical community to provide quantitative measures 
of change over the period 2015–30. Nevertheless, targets within Goal 16 reveal 
some of the challenges of over-relying on quantitative indicators. For example, SDG 
Indicator 16.1.1 supporting Target 16.1 on the reduction of lethal violence rates is 
highly exposed to the risk of showing an apparent reduction (thus a positive 
progress over time) due to underreporting, undercounting, or even data 
manipulation (for example by downgrading intentional homicide cases to 
unintentional43). Similarly, to measure progress towards a “significant reduction of 
illicit arms flows” (as foreseen by SDG Target 16.4), SDG Indicator 16.4.2 - on the 
proportion of firearms traced to their illicit origins - cannot capture much more than 
the ability of reporting countries to trace firearms. The official data collection 
mechanism for this indicator is the International Arms Flows Questionnaire 
(IAFQ),44 established by UNODC in consultation with UNODA. According to UNODC, 
countries successful in tracing firearms are more likely to report low seizure levels, 
 
41 As per 2030 Agenda’s notable principle that “nobody should be left behind”, SDG Target 17.18 calls 
for a significant increase in the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by 
income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other 
characteristics relevant in national contexts. 
42 See https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/indicators-list/ 
43 See John A. Eterno and Eli B. Silvermann, The Crime Numbers Game: Management by Manipulation, 
New York, 2012, cited in Wendy Ruderman, Crime Report Manipulation Is Common Among New York 
Police, Study Finds, in “The New York Times”, 28 June 2012, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/nyregion/new-york-police-department-manipulates-
crime-reports-study-finds.html 
44 See https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/iafq.html 
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as opposed to some countries with high levels of seizures which are less successful 
in tracing.45  
A mixed methods approach will therefore be necessary to systematically integrate 
quantitative and qualitative data, with a view to generating a more complete and 
fully informed impact assessment. 
To achieve this result, it will be necessary to carry out qualitative research, including 
surveys, in-depth interviews, and empirical fieldwork. Qualitative indicators could 
cover many aspects of the relationship between the State and firearms legislation, 
in connection with existing norms and their application, the awareness of basic facts 
relevant to the problem (such as types and extent of firearm violence) among the 
public and the judiciary, and the role and activity of civil society. These indicators 
can be correspondingly assessed using qualitative methods. One of the lessons of 
recent efforts to draw on both official and unofficial data sources to measure 
progress against violence reduction indicators is the central importance of 
qualitative data.46 
It is necessary to consider a set of impact indicators, first of all lethal and non-lethal 
incidents involving firearms (legal and illicit), types of arms used in different 
categories of crime, as well as seizure data.47 The capacity to produce, collect and 
analyse such data varies considerably among countries. For example, the UNODC 
Global Study on Firearms 2020 indicates that 80 UN Member States – including 
 
45 UNODC, Global Study on Firearms Trafficking 2020, see footnote n. 14, supra, p. 17. 
46 “Monitoring and Implementing SDG16+: The Relevance of Non-Official Data and Indices for the 




47 UNODC, Global Study on Firearms Trafficking 2020, see footnote n. 14, supra, pp. 77-84. This broad 
set of indicators could build on existing global databases, for example, the global database of the SDG 
indicators (https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/database), the UNODC Global Study on Homicide 
and relevant database (https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/global-study-on-
homicide.html), the Global Burden of Disease (http://www.healthdata.org/gbd/publications), WHO 
mortality data (https://www.who.int/data/data-collection-tools/who-mortality-database), as well 
as national and local relevant indicators, but also specialized databases maintained by civil society 
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parties and non-parties to the Protocol – were able to respond to the IAFQ and some 
supplementary data could be found only for 27 additional countries (see Map 2).48 
 
 
National statistical capacities and approaches differ significantly. Recent research 
carried out by the Small Arms Survey with UNODC and the African Union 
Commission included capacity support to a group of African States identify their 
own indicators for measuring (reductions of) illicit arms flows and impacts.49 While 
all States prioritized the importance of firearms killings, they also specified a range 
of other, locally-important indicators. These include, among others, data on civilian 
firearms licensing and registration; percentage of State-held firearms marked and 
recorded; locally-specific illicit arms flow indicators; numbers of firearms seized 
and/or destroyed; law enforcement operations and judicial cases dealing with illicit 
firearms trafficking; and an indicator of the existence of official standard operating 
 
48 Ibidem, p. 17.  
49 Final report of the UNSCAR-funded project Strengthening national institutions in developing a 
system of indicators on firearms (unpublished) https://www.un.org/disarmament/unscar/sas/ 
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procedures for safe and secure stockpile management. This suggests that a 
framework for the assessment of impacts of the Protocol could include some 
common key indicators but should also be context-specific and flexible.  
It should be noted, however, that there is significant regional variation in armed 
violence, and assessments will need to take this into account. This is one reason it 
may be difficult to establish a correlation between the (low/high) level of armed 
violence in a country and accession to/implementation of the Protocol. For example, 
scenarios in Latin American countries (where the odds of dying of violence are more 
than four times higher than the global average and about 60 percent of killings are 
committed with firearms50) are quite different from those in other regions 
characterized by lower levels of armed violence (such as Eastern Asia or Europe51). 
In these latter contexts, accession to the Firearms Protocol and other relevant 
instruments may be reflect a responsible action of multilateral diplomacy even in 
the absence of an emergent problem, thus reinforcing the existing arms control (and, 
by this logic, armed violence prevention) frameworks.  
 
 
5. A complex undertaking 
The idea of assessing a global firearms instrument for its potential impacts on armed 
violence makes intuitive sense. In fact, effective implementation of the international 
arms control regime, which includes the Protocol, is an essential component and a 
relevant contributor to achieving the SDG targets of a significant reduction in all 
forms of armed violence (Target 16.1) and of illicit arms flows (Target 16.4).52 In the 
 
50 See Gergely Hideg and Anna Alvazzi del Frate, Still Not There: Global Violent Deaths Scenarios, 2019–
30, cit., Table 2 (p. 6) and Figure 7 (p. 10). 
51 Ibidem. 
52 See, for example, Glenn McDonald, Luigi De Martino, Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: SDG Target 16.4, 
Small Arms Survey, Research Note No 57, Geneva, May 2016, p. 1; and Glenn McDonald, Anna Alvazzi 
del Frate, Moshe Ben Hamo Yeger, Arms Control 2.0: Operationalizing SDG Target 16.4, Small Arms 
Survey, Briefing Paper, Geneva, October 2017, pp. 3–4. International commitments on arms control 
and crime prevention, when transformed into domestic law, ultimately aim at significantly reducing 
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current context, therefore, developing a framework for assessing the impacts of the 
Protocol on armed violence reduction according to SDG 16 targets and indicators 
could be a valuable exercise. 
Since the instrument is operationalized through the development of national laws 
and policies, any assessment would have to address multiple steps, while also 
disentangling its role from that of other instruments, and measuring the impacts of 
the Protocol-specific actions. As the Protocol is part of an evolving comprehensive 
and integrated set of international instruments focusing on the firearms problem, 
separating out the impacts of the Protocol may be challenging. To some degree, 
there is value in assessing the effects of all relevant measures together, and this is a 
potentially more straightforward enterprise. At the same time, isolating the impacts 
of the criminalization and other administrative measures of the Protocol would be 
valuable for identifying how those specific efforts relate to levels of armed violence. 
This is feasible at the level of association rather than causation.  
Furthermore, different effects of the Protocol may relate to corresponding phases in 
the process of its operationalization at the national level: signature, ratification, 
initial implementation, subsequent State practices (including multiple enforcement 
actions by practitioners), with potentially very long delays between each of these 
steps. What is more, the motivations for States to accede to the Protocol can be very 
different: some may join because of the prominence of firearms in criminal violence 
within their borders; others may do so out of (regional or political) solidarity, 
opportunity, or other relevant considerations; or because they already have similar 
laws on their books and agree with the general approach.53 These underlying 
motivations may have implications for the robustness of implementation and, as a 
consequence, for any impacts on violence. For these reasons, the entire policy 
development and implementation process and sequencing needs to be taken into 
account in assessment efforts. 
 
53 For this reason, there may be a need to interrogate repositories of domestic legislation beyond the 
level of a simple checklist. Historical information on the development of legislation may provide 
crucial information. This type of analysis – relatively cumbersome – may be necessary to establish a 
baseline for assessing the impact of the Protocol in different countries. 
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Since armed violence prevention is somewhat ‘downstream’ from the 
criminalization and other preventive measures that the Protocol requires States 
Parties to introduce, it will be necessary to consider and control for the potential 
impacts of other factors on armed violence beyond the Protocol, including other 
arms control efforts or completely unrelated developments. These include: broad 
socio-economic crises; the commencement or cessation of armed conflict; 
independently evolving trends in illicit manufacture and trafficking of firearms; 
natural phenomena (such as the covid-related pandemic) among others. In an ideal 
world we would have the capacity and means to empirically link illicitly 
manufactured or trafficked firearms (and ammunition) to specific acts of armed 
violence; in the real world, this may not be practical in many cases. Many 
impediments interfere with a direct impact assessment, including the lack of robust 
baseline data in relevant health, crime, and other datasets.54 
It is also important to consider that the effects of any control measures may include 
displacement of the phenomena or the emergence of different scenarios. Trends in 
illicit firearm manufacture and trafficking are fluid and dynamic and can evolve in 
unexpected ways, both in response to enforcement efforts and other factors. For 
example, the banning of handguns in the United Kingdom and tighter EU-level 
firearm restrictions55 have undoubtedly helped reduce violence.56 But as handguns 
have become less available in these regions, convertible firearms have become more 
 
54 See for example the analysis of availability of firearms data presented by UNODC in the Global Study 
on Firearms Trafficking 2020 (see footnote n. 14, supra); the analysis of availability of data on violent 
deaths presented in Gergely Hideg and Anna Alvazzi del Frate, Counting and Characterizing Global 
Violent  Deaths: Current data sources, gaps and possible remedies, at the Global Registry of Violent 
Deaths (GReVD),2020,website https://grevd.org/; and the analysis of gender-relevant firearms 
datasets presented in Anna Alvazzi del Frate, Gergely Hideg and Emile LeBrun, Gender Counts: 
Assessing Global Armed Violence Datasets for Gender Relevance, Small Arms Survey, Briefing Paper, 
Geneva, March 2020. 
55 See the 1997 Firearms (Amendment) Acts, Violent Crime Reduction Act (2006), the Offensive 
Weapons Act (2019) of the United Kingdom, as well as the Directive (EU) 2017/853 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of 
the acquisition and possession of weapons; in OJEU L 137/22, 24 May 2017. 
56 The UK reports a 35 percent decrease in firearm killings between 2010-2020. See Office of National 
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visible,57 are more frequently seized and confiscated,58 and appear more frequently 
in different forms of violence.59 Legal frameworks need to be flexible enough to 
respond to this fluidity,60 and assessment efforts must also be wide enough to take 
account of these effects. There are also trends in firearms manufacturing technology, 
such as polymer weapons and 3D printing, that are highly relevant for enforcement 
efforts.61 
Despite the general scarcity of official data in these areas, significant sources of 
relevant information already exist, as well as replicable methodologies. These 
include surveys and empirical research already conducted by UNODC and 
independent research organizations.62 There is a firm basis for developing national 
 
57 See Nicolas Florquin, Benjamin King, From Legal to Lethal: Converted Firearms in Europe, Small 
Arms Survey, Geneva, April 2018. 
58 For example, in Denmark seizures of convertible alarm and gas pistols increased four times 
between 2014 and 2017. While in 2014 less than one-fifth of them had been converted, in the first 
months of 2017 this was the case with more than one in three. See Lina Grip, Illegal weapons, gangs 
and violent extremism in Denmark, Country study for the SAFTE project, Flemish Peace Institute, 
2018, Table 4, p. 138 - https://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/safte/publications.html. 
59 For instance, the 2015 terrorist attacks in Europe (Paris and Copenhagen) included, inter alia, the 
use of firearms that had been incorrectly deactivated or firearms assembled with badly deactivated 
components (as well as acoustic weapons being converted into real firearms). For an extensive 
analysis on the use of firearms (including converted and reactivated firearms) by terrorist groups in 
Europe see Nils Duquet, Kevin Goris, Firearms acquisition by terrorists in Europe. Research findings 
and policy recommendations of Project SAFTE, Flemish Peace Institute Brussels, 18 April 2018. 
60 Unlike the Protocol, which provides some flexibility with regard to national control regimes on 
deactivated weapons (Art. 9) and does not provide for a detailed discipline of conversion (although 
the definition of firearms under the Protocol includes all devices that “may be readily converted” into 
a firearm), recent European legislation [Directive (EU) 2017/853 (see footnote n. 55, supra) and 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/337 of 5 March 2018 amending Implementing 
Regulation (EU) 2015/2403 establishing common guidelines on deactivation standards and 
techniques for ensuring that deactivated firearms are rendered irreversibly inoperable, in OJEU, L 
65/1, 8 March 2018] establishes several regulatory measures on deactivated/reactivated and 
converted firearms; see Christian Ponti, An Appraisal of the European Union Legal Framework on Illicit 
Firearms Trafficking after Directive 2017/853/EU, in this Journal vol. 4 (2) 2018, pp. 13-34. 
61 For a cursory analysis of the actual effectiveness of the Firearms Protocol to address these issues 
see Responsiveness of the Firearms Protocol and national legislation to new and emerging threats 
relating to the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and 
ammunition, Background paper prepared by the Secretariat, UN Doc. CTOC/COP/WG.6/2020/2, 14 
January 2020, especially paras. 34-54. States’ concerns about the criminal exploitation of new 
technologies such as 3D printing and polymer and modular weapons have been also an important 
stream of discussion in the UN PoA’s review process. The PoA’s Eighth Biennial Meeting of States will 
consider whether to establish an open-ended technical expert group on this issue in 2022; see UN 
General Assembly, Outcome of the Seventh Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation 
of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All its Aspects, UN Doc. A/CONF.192/BMS/2021/CRP.2/Rev.1, 30 July 2021, para. 92. 
62 Including, for example, the databases on homicides, firearms and other relevant data held by 
UNODC (see https://dataunodc.un.org/); the databases on Global Violent Deaths and Global 
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violence assessment research efforts and indicators, which would draw on data 
collected to measure progress towards SDG Targets 16.1 and 16.4, especially. The 
extent to which States make other data available to researchers will influence how 
robust assessments can be, and how useful they can be in linking specific 
implementation efforts to violence reduction, thus enhancing the effectiveness of 
the Protocol's impacts for all States parties. 
 
 
6. Leveraging the Review Mechanism of the Protocol 
The establishment in 2018 of a Review Mechanism63 marks a promising step in the 
evolution of the implementation process and compliance with the Protocol––and 
progress in the critical assessment of its impact on armed violence. Officially 
launched in October 2020,64 it is mandatory on all States parties, although it does 
not provide for sanctions in case of non-participation. The Review Mechanism 
includes a general review that takes place in the plenary session of the Conference 
of the Parties to the UNTOC and country reviews. These encompass a self-
assessment with the aim to gather information on implementation;65 and a 
substantive desk peer evaluation component 66 in which each State’s performance is 
 
Firearms Holding of the Small Arms Survey (see https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/databases); the 
Global Database of the SDG indicators (see https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/unsdg), etc. 
63 See footnote n. 6, supra. 
64 Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
Tenth Session, Vienna, 12-16 October 2020, Resolution 10/1, Launch of the review process of the 
Mechanism for the Review of the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto, CTOC/COP/2020/10, 3 November 2020. 
65 The Review Mechanism will provide, in a period of 10 years, for a mandatory mutual evaluation in 
different cycles of all relevant substantive provisions of the Protocol. With the aim to review each 
thematic cluster of articles of the Protocol (criminalization, jurisdiction, prevention, law enforcement 
and international cooperation, etc.), the States under review complete the relevant sections of a self-
assessment questionnaire on their implementation and compliance with the Protocol. 
66 Information may only be examined electronically remotely through the use of a new secure module 
of the knowledge management portal SHERLOC. Reviewing states are not allowed to carry out on-
site visits to the peer reviewed country (for instance, this happens under the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention, whose monitoring 
system foresees a mechanism of mandatory country visits; under other peer review treaty bodies 
such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) Review Mechanism on-site visits 
may take place, but only with the consent reviewed State). These visits which vary in scope (they 
typically include interviews, inspections, and meetings with the main stakeholders involved in the 
domestic implementation process) are of crucial importance to assess compliance by measuring the 
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evaluated by two other States parties (with the assistance of the Secretariat and the 
active involvement of the State under review).67 The goal is to help the reviewed 
State improve its policymaking, adopt best practices, implement, and comply with 
the Protocol. 
The Review Mechanism rules encourage States parties to involve relevant civil 
society stakeholders (academia, NGOs, and private sector) both in the consultation 
and the assessment phases.68 Involving research institutions early in the process 
would increase the inclusiveness, transparency, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the 
Review Mechanism.  
Civil society is well placed to undertake broad consultations with the purpose to 
help governments to fully complete their self-assessment questionnaires. For 
instance, by gathering valuable non-official information and data, and developing 
multi-disciplinary research efforts on synergies and complementarity between the 
implementation of the Protocol and other global arms control instruments such as 
the ATT and PoA.69 Qualitative research, flexible indicators, rigorous, objective, and 
scientific findings could positively influence policymaking and enhance not only the 
implementation of the Protocol but its approaches to illicit firearms manufacture 
and trafficking and their connection to armed violence.  
It is established that the reviewing States, at the final stage of each review phase for 
each State party, and in close cooperation with the State party under review (and 
with the assistance of the Secretariat), must prepare a list of observations. This 
represents an absolute novelty within the context of global small arms control 
instrument review processes. Assessment criteria for this country review report 
include any gaps and challenges in the implementation of the provisions under 
 
actual practice of international norms within the State by practitioners, government, and law 
enforcement officials.  
67 Each state, on a rotating basis, takes its turn as a reviewer and as a subject of review. 
68 See Procedures and rules for the functioning of the Mechanism for the Review of the Implementation 
of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto , 
Resolution 9/1, Annex, footnote n. 6, supra, paras. 23 and 53. 
69 Unfortunately, States parties to the ATT have decided to exclude civil society from some key 
aspects of information exchange, most notably the Diversion Information Exchange Forum.   
Discipline 
25 
Cross Vol.7 N°2 (2021) - DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.54103/cross-16847 
review, as well as best practices, suggestions, and any technical assistance needs 
identified to improve the implementation and compliance with the Protocol.70  
The country review report is made available to the Working Group on firearms, an 
intergovernmental subsidiary body of the Conference of the Parties that is convened 
every two years. The Working Group, which provides an important forum for 
exchanges of view among firearms experts, submits its observations (including 
proposals for recommendations and technical assistance needs) to the Conference 
of the Parties for its final decisions.  
Non-governmental stakeholders may effectively contribute to monitoring and 
evaluation of State’s performance at this stage: for instance, by preparing 
independent studies and reports, indicating any gaps and challenges in the 
implementation of the Protocol’s provisions under review and existing best 
practices, as well as their impact on armed violence. 
The entire monitoring exercise provided by the Review Mechanism does not 
produce any ranking or sanctions and aims to help States parties to build their own 
capacities for implementing and complying with the Protocol. This provides room 
for collaborative engagement between governments and civil society both in the 
consultation and assessment phase. The governmental (and non-adversarial) 
character of the Review Mechanism, combined with the educational function 
(reciprocal learning) of the peer review,71 are expected to facilitate acceptance and 
the membership to the process, as well as dialogue and mutual trust between States 
parties to the Protocol, and between them and civil society stakeholders. But, with 
 
70 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, Tenth Session, Vienna, 12-16 October 2020, Resolution 10/1, Launch of the review process of 
the Mechanism for the Review of the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto, cit., Annex II, Blueprint for the list of 
observations for country reviews. 
71 See Georgios Dimitropoulos, Compliance through collegiality: peer review in international law, Max 
Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law, 
Luxembourg, Working Paper 3, 2014, pp. 25–40; and, more specifically, Christian Ponti, The Review 
Mechanism of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and Its Protocols. 
An Analysis Based on Peer Review Methodology, in The Palermo Convention at Twenty, Institutional and 
Substantive Challenges, Serena Forlati (ed.), Brill Research Perspectives in Transnational Crime, 
2020, pp. 22-38. 
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the aim to maximizing the effectiveness of the review, transparency and 
inclusiveness should complement the evaluation.72 
A separate independent tool to measure armed violence impacts would provide 
additional information to all stakeholders engaged in the Mechanism. The relation 
of armed violence impact assessment research efforts to the Review Mechanism will 
need to be further explored as the Mechanism evolves and States parties become 
active in it. There are a number of different possibilities to advance a process to 
“accompany” States parties in their self-assessment,73 as well as in the evaluation 
phase (for instance, through a wide participation of civil society stakeholders, with 
the purpose of maximizing the effectiveness of the constructive dialogues74 that will 
take place alongside the meetings of the Working Group on Firearms). This tool 
would represent an important element in the process to ensure the full potential of 




7. Concluding remarks 
The first global arms control instruments are now twenty years old. Those early 
agreements have since spawned additional global, regional, and sub-regional 
frameworks, many of a legally binding character. These, in turn, have generated 
 
72 Unfortunately, although transparency is listed as the first guiding principle of the Review 
Mechanism, this requirement has vanished during negotiations in the Conference, so that States 
parties to the Protocol may decide not to disclose all data submitted during the evaluation. These 
limitations call on States parties to show willingness and strong political commitment in supporting 
transparency and inclusiveness, with the aim to consolidate the legitimacy of the Review Mechanism. 
73 See, for instance, the publication by UNODC Civil Society Team of a toolkit, with the purpose of 
strengthening the capacity of civil society actors to contribute and to develop strategies (through the 
engagement with their governments, and in partnership with UNODC) aimed to implement the 
UNTOC and its supplementing Protocols; see UNODC, Toolkit on Stakeholder Engagement 
Implementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), Vienna, 
2020. 
74 Notwithstanding their expected marginality in the process (at least on the paper), these meetings 
will be convened from 2022 only after the adoption of the final reports by the Working Group 
(therefore, the possibility of an impact on the part of civil society is very low), they nonetheless 
represent the main engagement point through which civil society can present to and discuss with 
States parties their observations about implementation and compliance with the Protocol. 
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significant activity at the national level across multiple domains and authorities, 
from the passage of new laws criminalizing certain acts to the establishment of 
enhanced State policies, procedures and mechanisms. The thematic focuses and 
short-term objectives of these instruments vary: some are broad and inclusive; 
others relate more narrowly to specific concerns, such as transfer controls, or illicit 
manufacture and trafficking. Yet they all aim towards the long-term objective of 
reducing armed violence and promoting safer and more secure societies. 
It is time to begin to ask whether the activities generated by these instruments have 
had any measurable impact on long-term violence reduction objectives. This paper 
has suggested that the Firearms Protocol of the UNTOC is a strong candidate for 
impact evaluation given its age, its relatively narrow scope compared to other 
instruments, and recent progress made in establishing an official implementation 
evaluation process--the Review Mechanism.  
As a new approach in the domain of global arms control instruments, designing and 
implementing impact evaluations must necessarily face a number of challenges, 
including the availability of and access to relevant data, the difficulty of attributing 
activities and outcomes to specific instruments, and controlling for the many 
relevant factors outside the realm of arms control policymaking. These and other 
challenges, while significant, should not prevent the attempt to gain what are in 
effect insights into the ultimate utility of these instruments, measured against the 
objectives that they were designed to address. Indeed, Agenda 2030 commitments 
make such an exercise necessary. 
This paper has sketched some initial thinking for how armed violence impact tools 
might be developed to accompany and inform the Firearms Protocol’s planned 
assessment procedures within the Review Mechanism. Clearly, for such a proposal 
to gain traction, it must be a collaborative and mutually-supportive exercise 
involving academia, civil society, and national authorities, who must all share an 
investment in the outcomes. Indeed, only collective commitments among these 
actors will ensure that the insights generated by impact evaluations are considered 
and acted upon––and can ultimately contribute to making a difference in the lives of 
people they are designed to serve. 
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